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THE RATIONALE OF THE INJUNCTION
The nature of the so-called injunction is too well known
to require exposition. Story's definition that it is judicial
process whereby a party is "required to do a particular
thing, or to refrain from doing a particular thing," and
which is said by Beach' to have been "generally adopted
by subsequent authors," will suffice for the present pur-
pose of the writer. To prescribe to the subjects of the
State the doing or the abstaining from doing of certain
things, is the essence of legislation. "Do not boycott,"
"Do not picket," "Do not steal," "Do not murder," under
penalty, if the voice of the General Assembly of a State, or
of the Congress of the United States, would be at once pro-
nounced a law. Would it be the less a law, if it issued
from a so-called king? Or president? Or from a so-call-
ed judge?
The distinction may be pointed out between a com-
mand to do or to abstain, which is addressed to a class
of persons, and one which is addressed to particular per-
sons. The distinction is not essential and specific. The
so-called law may be addressed to a very small class of
persons, to druggists, e. g., or lawyers, or auctioneers, to
"Injunctions 2.
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automobilists, or owners of dogs.2 On the other hand,
the so-called injunction may be imposed on indeterminate
persons. Persons not named as parties, and not included
in the writ may be its subjects. Pomeroy complains of
"the sweeping injunction that includes all who cross its
path, though neither parties defendant nor named in the
injunction," and says it is properly criticized.' He quotes
W. H. Dunbar' as saying that at present the Court may
"ex-parte, upon motion of the plaintiff issue an order re-
straining all persons from doing specific acts, although
such persons are not parties to the cause and in no way
connected with it and cannot be identified except by the
fact of their violating the injunction."
In Ex parte Lennon5 a judge's command to a class,
viz,, persons connected with certain corporations as offi-
cers, agents, servants, and employes, was held to impose
a duty on Lennon, a locomotive engineer, although he was
not a party to the suit, could, therefore, not have been
heard in it, and was not served with process, or with no-
tice of application for, or a copy of, the injuction. These
facts, said the Court, are all immaterial, if he knows of
the issue of the injunction. If under constitutions not
forbidding special legislation, the legislators should forbid
under penalty, the invasion of A's property, the Courts
would hardly presume to deny validity to the prohibition.
It would be legislation. So surely would a prohibition by
a judge of the same act in the same form.
That the Courts have a legislative power must be
confessed by every competent observer. "That judges
2The constitution not forbidding, a law may be directed to a
definite person; as in legislative divorce; legislation with respect to
particular corporations; legislation granting pensions.
36 Bq. Juris. 1043.
41n 13 Law Quart. Rev. 348.
5166 U. S. 548; Cf. In re Bersette, 111 Fed. 417; Bersette v. Con-
key Co., 194 U. S. 324.
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in England," says Markby, "can and do make law, no one
can deny." He cites the rule of "Undue influence" as be-
ing "as binding as an act of Parliament." Indeed, the
product of the legislative activity of the judges is found in
the vast body of law to which the subjects of every mod-
ern state submit. What is the law of real property, of
torts, of contracts, of corporations, of pleading, of evi-
dence, for the most part, but a conspectus of numberless
adjudications of the Courts, in which the principles ap-
plied to the conduct of the litigants have been announced
ex post facto? If Courts may enforce after the event, in
a given case, principles, in order, in part, that they may
become regulative of future conduct, there can be no ob-
jection to their laying down in advance a line of conduct,
and requiring conformity with it by a genuine prospective
(rather than retrospective) command or prohibition,
frankly recognizing itself as such. Only doctrinaires who
have not dipped below the surface of things, say that the.
judicial and the legislative functions are, in our system,
invariably assigned to different organs.
The legislative power of the Courts, however, is sub-
ordinate, like that of a municipal council or of a territorial
legislature, to the power of the so-called supreme legisla-
tive body. Any common law doctrine of real property or
contracts can be expelled from the law by statute. Even
rules of pleading, or of evidence, which have been fashion-
ed by the judges, may be abolished or modified by so-called
legislation. And many of the acts or omissions which (in
rElements of Law. p. 11. The same view has been stated by
Austin, Bentham and the philosophical school of jurists generally.
The latest defence of the theory that custom is law, that of James
C. Carter, (in Law, its Origin, Growth and Function,) ignores the
difference between habitually or customarily doing a thing, and be-
ing obliged to do it in a given case, because it has been habitually
or customarily done, in similar cases. It ignores the difference be-
tween a custom of the peolife to act thus and thus, and a custom of
judicial or executive officers of a state, to oblige them to act thus
and thus.
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what we have called the prospective legislation of the
Courts, that is, in their injunctions), have been forbidden
or commanded, the legislature may doubtless make lawful
and authorize. Striking, boycotting, picketing, blacklist-
ing may be legalized by the ostensible legislature, and
made so far right that the judges, however averse they
may be to the lawmakers' policy, shall be constrained to
desist from issuing injunctions against them.7 Apparent-
ly the federal Courts concede that Congress may take
away from all except the Supreme Court, the power to
forbid by injunction, or-the same thing-the power to
punish for the breach of the prohibition. The act of
Congress of March 2d, 1831, limits the power of the
Courts summarily to punish for contempts, to cases of mis-
behavior in their presence or so near thereto as to ob-
struct the administration of justice. Doubting, apparent-
ly, whether Congress could limit the power of the Supreme
.Court of the United States, in cases of contempt, because
that Court derives its existence and powers from the Con-
stitution, Field, J., conceded, that the legislation of Con-
gress applied to the Circuit and District Courts which it
created. "The act of 1831 is, therefore, to them, the law
specifying the cases in which summary punishment for
contempts may be inflicted." The act of Congress limit-
ing the punishments that the Courts could inflict for con-
tempt, to fine or imprisonment, "the enactment is a lim-
itation upon the manner in which the power shall be exer-
cised, and must be held to be a negation of all other modes
T.In Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, an Act of Assembly did not
legitimate conspiracies to strike and boycott, but declared that such
conspiracies should not be indictable. The court not forbidden itself
to prohibit these acts, launched its injunction. It suggested that
the constitution might take from the legislature the power of
legitimating certain invasions of what are yet the rights of persons
with regard to property, and in such cases the courts could by in-
junction prohibit acts violative of these rights, despite the attempt-
ed legalization of them.
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of punishment." Hence a disbarment of the person found
to be in contempt (an attorney of the Court) was void.8
In the absence of prohibitory legislation by Congress,
the Federal Courts have the power to command persons
to do or refrain from doing sundry things; that is, they
have a quasi-legislative power. The fact that Congress
forbids by statute, under penalty, certain acts, does not
prevent the Courts from forbidding the same acts. As
Congress and the Courts are but organs of the State, it
might be imagined, that the duplication of the prohibition
would not involve a duplication of the punishment. That
inference, it seems, is erroneous. Congress may say, do
not boycott, and if you do I will treat you as a misde-
meanant and punish you with one month's imprisonment.
But the Court may also say, do not boycott, and, if the
order is disobeyed, may imprison for six months and im-
pose a fine besides; and punishment for the contempt in
boycotting will not exonerate from the congressional pun-
ishment upon indictment, besides. The fact that the act
is already forbidden under penalty by Congress is no reas-
on for the judge's declining also to forbid it, under other
penalties which he may choose to impose., And having
been punished for the act by the judge-as for contempt of
Court, the doer may be again punished for having con-
temned the Congress. Thus it happens that a vast number
of acts which have been penalized by one organ of the
government may again be penalized by another organ of
it. A little ingenuity in the formation of governmental
contrivances might make it possible for a man to be pun-
ished three or four times for the same act, because three
8Ex parte Robinson, 86 U. S. 505; Bersette v. Conkey Co., 194
U. S. 324.
9In re Chapman. 166 U. S. 661. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564;
Pomeroy, 5 Eq. Juris. 792. In in re Chapman it is said that the act of
refusing to testify before a Committee of either house of Congress
may by law be made indictable, and after it is punished under an in-
dictment may be punished again by the House which has been con-
temned in the refusal to give the testimony.
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or four public functionaries happen to have concurred in
forbidding it. The act is a disobedience not of the State,
but of the officers of it!
It is sometimes said that the injunction is preventive
of the acts which it forbids. Says Nelson, J., "An injunc-
tion is generally a preventive, but not an affirmative rem-
edy."10  Chitty refers to it as a "method by which the
Court of Chancery interferes to prevent the commission
of fraud or mischief.",l Even Holland observes, "Some-
times the law intervenes for prevention as by the injunc-
tions, which have long been issued by the Court of Chan-
cery, to forbid a threatened mischief, and by the orders
made by the Roman praetors in cases novi operis denuntia-
tio, or damnum infectum."I2 Justice Brewer has on sever-
al occasions said extra-judicially, that the injunction pre-
vents, and he has contrasted it with the other procedures
of the law which simply punish. In an address at the
recent commencement of Clark's College, Mass., in depre-
cating the attempt to curtail the Court's power to enjoin,
he said once more, "It is better to prevent wrong than to
punish the perpetrator. The whole scientific thought of
today is to cure evils rather than to punish them." The
ineptitude of this distinction between preventing, curing,
on one side, and punishing on the other, will appear, we
think, on the slightest consideration.
How does one man "prevent" another man's doing
an act? There are two ways. He may prevent the rise
of a volition to do it, or he may oppose overwhelming force
to the effort to do it. A attempts to carry off a watch
belonging to B. B may seize him, and with superior mus-
cular force hold him to the spot. The attempted asporta-
tion is then not done, not because A has not willed to do
it, but because his executive efforts have been mechan-
loWalkley v. City of Muscatine, 73 U. S. 930.
113 Blackstone, 426 note. "Wrongs prevented" is the page head-
ing of the first chapter of Spelling's treatise on Injunctions, etc.
:LElements of Jurisprudence, 284.
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ically overcome. Does the injunction prevent in this way?
Does the enjoining Chancellor station himself, or the sher-
iff, or other officer, beside the enjoined person, and physi-
cally prevent his doing the forbidden act?
The only way in which the injunction prevents, then,
is in preventing the rise into existence of the desire, the
will, to do the act. This might be done by diffusing
through the mind of the enjoined person, a spirit of loyal-
ty, of love, of reverence, begetting a desire to submit and
obey. Does the injunction act so? It is a mere forbid-
ding, a prohibition. The criminal law is the same. Par-
liament says, "Do not steal." Does this parliamentary
injunction beget such reverence and respect, that it is
obeyed? It does, in some cases, and there are persons
also, who, even were there no governmental prohibition,
would commit no theft. But the Parliament does not rely
on respect, reverence, loyalty, as a sufficient cause of sub-
mission to command. Parliament is composed of two
houses, each of 600 of the most eminent men in the king-
dom, men distinguished for age, wealth, learning, business
training, imposing family histories. Do they inspire suf-
ficient reverence for their mandates to secure obedience?
And if they do not, are we to concede that the single in-
dividual called the chancellor, inspires for his orders, a
veneration which the august parliament has failed to in-
fuse? How, then, is obedience to be secured? "Preven-
tion," which means obedience?
The answer has been long known. "Of all the parts
of a law, the most effectual," says Blackstone,1 3 "is the
vindicatory, for it is but lost labor to say 'do this' or 'avoid
that' unless we also declare 'this shall be theconsequence
of your non-compliance.'" "Nothing is compulsory but
punishment." Markby observes: - "But at the same time
"31 Comm. 57.
14Elements of Law, p. 7. Cf. Austin's Providence of Jurisprudence,
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it is impossible that law should exist without force, and it
is desirable in the analysis of law to bring into prominence
this feature of it, for the very reason that it might other-
wise be overlooked. It is also desirable that we should be
reminded that it is this force which causes every declara-
tion of the sovereign to be something which is not advice,
nor an ideal, nor custom, nor an example of any kind, but
an imperative command, as much as any article of the
penal code." The command of a judge secures respect,
obedience, only because he is believed to have the power to
punish disobedience, and to have the purpose to use this
power. The legislature, then, when it says, do not steal,
do not commit arson, do not murder, do not boycott, is "pre-
venting" theft, arson, murder, boycotting, if the judge,
when he says the same things, is preventing them. Some-
body in the State has the will and power to impose the
penalties prescribed by the legislature. This induces an ex-
pectation in X's mind, when he is tempted to do the forbid-
den act, that if he does it, he will suffer a penalty, and the
expectation deters him often. So, when the judge orders
him to refrain from certain acts, he anticipates that if he
disobeys, somebody, the judge, or another, will cause him
to suffer. It is entirely clear, then, that injunction is pre-
vention, only as any command of an authority in the State
is prevention: viz., because punishment will follow disobe-
dience. How meaningless, then, and superficial, is the re-
mark above quoted, "it is better to prevent wrong than to
punish the perpetrator." The wrong is prevented only
by the conviction of the sureness of the sequence of the
punishment upon the disobedience. But, there
could be no such conviction, unless in past
cases, there was in fact such a sequence. Ac-
tual punishment upon disobedience in case (a) causes
the expectation of punishment in case (b), should there be
disobedience, and probably prevents such disobedience. The
judge's injunction acts as does the legislature's prohibition.
They are both supported by the sanction of punishment.
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The anticipation of this punishment prevents the forbidden
act, i. e., induces abstinence from it. It is doubtless always
better that a man should not steal, and so should avoid the
punishment of larceny, than that he should steal and suffer
the penalty. For him, for the State, avoidance of the act
is better than punishment for it, but his avoidance is caus-
ed in part by the apprehension of the punishment.
Perhaps by the issue of an injunction abstinence from
an act is more certainly secured than it would be secured
without it. This may happen in various ways. The judge
may inflict a severer punishment than the legislature has
imposed on it. In that case the greater severity of the
punishment is the greater deterrent. The certainty of the
sequence of the penalty when the Court has issued the com-
mand, may also make the punishment a dissuasive. The
judge is apt to be more interested in punishing those who
have violated his prohibitions, than those who have violated
the prohibition of another judge, or of the legislature. Ob-
jection to the plan of having another judge administer the
punishment, than the one who launched the interdict, of
which we occasionally hear expressions, is founded largely
no doubt, upon the consciousness that another person would
not be so keen to punish a disobedience to one's commands,
as would one's self. The promptness with which the pun-
ishment is apt to follow the defiance of the injunction,
doubtless increases its deterrent force..
The legislature has a larger dignity than the judge of
an inferior court. It represents the State. It is a numer-
ous body, whose members are chosen by the people for
short terms, and who are, therefore, apt to understand and
be exponents of their will. But, the arrangements of the
governmental system are such, that this legislature can
simply lay down the commands or prohibitions and pre-
scribe the punishments. It cannot do anything towards
enforcing its own laws. This function is allotted to the
executive department, including the judges. They may or
may not be in sympathy with the law. They may be in-
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dustrious or remiss, in pursuing violators of the law. If
judges, they may avoid the law by declaring it unconstitu-
tional, or, when so drastic a way of getting rid of it is not
advisable, by putting interpretations on it, which make it
fail to effect the objects of those who enacted it. They
may invent rules of procedure, of pleading, of evidence
which make conviction extremely difficult. They may re-
quire a degree of conviction of guilt, in excess of that which
is usually insisted on in life beyond the Court room. The
legislature, also, is unable, under most State, and the Fed-
eral, constitutions, to procure punishment of violators of
their commands, without the consent of twelve unofficial
persons. The legislature is the guardian of the health,
morals, repose, education, of the people; yet the people
with more or less deliberateness, have themselves framed
or allowed others to frame for them a Constitution which
thus reduces the ability of the law makers to secure obser-
vance of their mandates. The thought underlying such an
arrangement, is that something is more valuable than cer-
tainty and celerity of punishment of crime. The govern-
mental machine may be too efficient. It may become ener-
getic and tyrannical. Hence, it has been assumed as an in-
violable principle, that the powers of government must be
dispersed; and in particular, that the authority which is-
sues a command must not have the power to apprehend,
accuse, try, convict and sentence one accused of disobeying
it. "In all tyrannical governments" said Blackstone,1 "the
supreme magistracy or the right of both making and en-
forcing the laws is vested in one and the same man, or one
and the same body of men; and wherever these two powers
are united together, there can be no public liberty." In the
45th Federalist, Madison, J., said: "No political truth is
certainly of greater intrinsic value or is stamped with the
authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty than that
on which the objection (viz., that the Constitution of 1788
united various sorts of powers in the same person) is
151 Comm. 145.
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founded; the accumulation of all powers legislative, execu-
tive and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one or
few or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny." He quotes Montesquieu in the 47th Federalist:
"Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbi-
trary control, for the judge would then be the legislature.
Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might be-
have with all the violence of an oppressor." Nearly every
constitution of the States at the time of the adoption of
the Federal Constitution, declared that the three powers,
legislative, executive and judicial, should be kept distinct.
In his American Commonwealth, Bryce says: "No general
principle of politics laid such hold on the Constitution mak-
ers and statesmen of America as the dogma that the sep-
aration of these three functions is essential to freedom. It
had already been made the ground work of several State
Constitutions. It is always reappearing in their writings,
it was never absent from their thoughts". Thus it was
feared that a very efficient government would become
tyrannical, and a system by which one element of the gov-
ernment more or less thwarted another was adopted, be-
cause liberty with an inefficient government was deemed
better than efficient government, with the risks of its be-
ing tyrannical.
If a so-called legislature, with power to enforce its
laws, is inadmissible, can any one suggest why any other
officer performing legislative work should have this power?
If the men who compose the legislature would be too eager
to convict of a violation of their order, will not the man
who, though called a judge, issues a prohibition be too eager
also to convict? Many laws are old, and the legislatures
that enacted them have gone out of existence. The zeal
of their successors to punish infractions of their general
commands would be extremely tepid, in comparison with
the ardor to vindicate his authority, of the man who but a
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month ago hurled his edict at specific persons. If it is
safer to let one man do the prescribing of conduct, in one
case, and another do the convicting for disobedience why
is it not safer, whether that man is a lawyer sitting as a
congressman or a lawyer sitting as a judge?
What is the method by which the violation of injunc-
tion is ascertained and punished? Is another than the en-
joiner made the prosecutor, another the judge of guilt and
the definer of the penalty? To the suggestion that when
an injunction is violated, another judge than he who is-
sued it, should try the person accused of disobeying it, the
answer, curt and simple, of Brewer, J., is:- "It would de-
prive the proceedings of half of its efficiency." 16 Pre-
cisely the objection that every absolutist, every friend of
strong government has made against a parliamentary re-
gime, against independent Courts, against juries. These
are so many clogs on government, making its movements
uncertain, slow, inefficient. The people-elected law.,giver
must not have the power to enforce his own law. The ju-
dicial law-giver must. Judge A has launched an interdict.
It has been disregarded. Even another judge, B, cannot
be trusted to enforce the punishment swiftly and ruthless-
ly enough. He will lack the motive of self-vindication of a
contemned personal authority.
The analogy between the trial of a man for contempt
in disobeying the order of the judge, and a trial for violat-
ing a penal statute, is recognized by the Courts. "Con-
tempt of Court," said Swayne, J., "is a specific criminal
offense. The imposition of the fine (in a contempt pro-
ceeding) was a judgment in a criminal case."' "When a
Court," said Story, J.,'I "commits a party for a contempt
(here, in refusing, as a witness, to answer a question) their
adjudication is a conviction, and their commitment in con-
sequence, is execution." A conviction for contempt in as-
16In re Debs, 158 U. S. 563.
"7New Orleans v. N. Y. Mail S. S. Co., 20 Wal, 387.
1SEx parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38.
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saulting a trustee, was said by Fuller, C. J., to be "in effect
a judgment in a criminal case over which this Court (the
Supreme Court) has no jurisdiction on error."'1  The pro-
ceeding may be prompted by a party, just as a private per-
son may originate a prosecution; but the offense investi-
gated is not a wrong to him but to the public, through its
officer, the judge. The fine, if fine is imposed, does not
go into the pocket of the party. The object need not be
to compensate him, or to secure the performance for him
of an act, such as, e. g., the execution of a deed, in whose
performance he is interested. Its object may be wholly
punitive.
If then, the trial of a charge of contempt is a trial of
a criminal charge, why are not the safeguards thrown
around persons accused of violating the legislator-made
criminal law, thrown around one accused of violating the
judge-made criminal law? Is it because the same kind of
investigation is not involved? The same kind is involved.
Were acts of a certain sort done, is the question. There
are witnesses for and witnesses against. Their credit must
be appraised. Their testimony must be combined. The
peculiar work of a jury must be performed.20 The oath of
the party accused exonerating himself is not conclusive.21
Should not the Court which has been contemned, at
least be assisted by a jury in the determination of the facts?
According to existing constitutional arrangements, men
must not be liable to be convicted of crime, by the sole ac-
tion of officials. Unofficial persons must be called in. Their
participation in the trial is a safeguard of the accused.
Would it not be as valuable to him, when the crime for
which one is on trial is not contempt of the legislature in
doing that which it has forbidden, but contempt of a judge,
190Neal v. United States, 190 U. S. 36.
2oWitnesses on both sides were heard. O'Neal v. United States
190 U. S. 36; United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563.
2lUnited States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563.
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in doing that which he has forbidden, to have the facts
found by the tribunal which for centuries in the Anglo-
Saxon world has been deemed the palladium of the accused?
But there are objections by judges resolute to punish for
contempt. The jury might not be convinced with suffi-
cient readiness. "To submit the question of disobedience
to another tribunal, be it a jury or another Court," says
Brewer, J., "would operate to deprive the proceedings of
half its efficiency."2 2 Miller, J., said2s "that if it has ever
been understood that proceedings according to the common
law for contempt of Court have been subject to the right
of trial by jury, we have been unable to find any instance
of it." So, in order to make conviction sure, the necessity
of submitting the evidence to the tribunal which venerable
tradition has signalized as a shield of innocence, is denied.
The judge who is trying a man for contempt of himself,
less needs the cool, dispassionate and moderating temper of
the jury than the judge who is trying for a contempt of
the legislature. It was such desire for sure and swift
conviction that led in English history to the establishment
of the Court of Star Chamber and other courts whose pro-
cedure was free from the checks of juries.2 4
It is a violation of the principle of Anglo-Saxon law
that the authority which issues the command shall not try
the accused of violating it, to allow the judge who has is-
sued the injunction, to sit in judgment on the guilt of the
accused. Another venerable principle is also set at naught.
There is no definition in advance of the violation of the in-
2
2In re Debs, 158 U. S. 563.
23Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U. S. 31; Bersette v. Conkey
Co., 194 U. S. 324.
240f the Star Chamber, Prof. G. W. Prothero says, in the Ency-
clopedia Britannica, "Its procedure was not according to the common
law. It dispensed with the encumbrance of a jury. It could pro-
ceed on mere rumor, or examine witnesses, it could apply torture,
it could inflict any penalty short of death. It was thus admirably
ca'culated to be the support of order against anarchy, or of despotism
against individual and national liberty."
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junction, of the penalty of such violation. The punishments
usually imposed by judges are fine and imprisonment. But
there is no fixed maximum. The imprisonment may be a
week, a year, ten years, for life. The fine may be $100,
$1000, or $10,000 unless Congress intervenes and prescribes
maxima, and unless the Courts refrain from saying that
such intervention of Congress is unconstitutional. Indeed,
so far as appears, there is nothing to hinder the Courts
sentencing men to death for disobedience in the absence of
restraining legislation. If they choose to think and say
that such a punishment is not cruel nor unusual, there is
no power elsewhere that can interfere. The man who is
accused by a judge of violating his command, virtually
holds his property and his liberty at least at the mercy of
the accuser.
That the same man should issue a command; should
summon X before him for having disobeyed it, should him-
self hear such evidence as he chooses and interpret it as he
will; should find the accused guilty and should out of the
many possible punishments select what seems to him
good, is a phenomenon not often tolerated by our jurispru-
dence. But it is exhibited to us when the offended judge
hales the offender before him, hears as much or as little ev-
idence as he chooses, weighs the evidence with as much or
tas little scrupulousness and intelligence as it seems good to
him to exhibit, and finding the accused guilty draws from
the undefined penalties possible to his imagination, that
which corresponds with this judgment, his caprice, or his
vindictiveness, and imposes it with as much forbearance
or harshness as his mood suggests.
To make the situation of the accused worse, and his
helplessness the more complete, the principle has been
widely adopted, that no other court can by habeas corpus
or writ of error, sit in judgment on the legality of 'the trial
and punishment, a principle for relief from the operation
of which the accused is indebted to the intervention of the
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legislature or of Congress. Appellate jurisdiction, or jur.
isdiction on habeas corpus in contempt cases is renounced
by the Federal Courts, 25 in the absence of congressional leg-
islation. In the Federal system, said Miller, J., there is
no relief from a judgment of a Court in proceedings for
contempt, "except through the Court making the or-
der, or possibly, by- the exercise of the pardoning power."2
Or when the order, the violation of which is the alleged con-
tempt, was beyond -the jurisdiction of the Court. 7  Re-
lief against this (as it must at times be deemed) defect of
remedy, may be furnished by Congress, 8 as may also re-
lief from the policy which allows -the facts conceived to
constitute the contempt to be found by the contemned per-
son, and does not require them to be found by another
judge, or by a jury.
It is better, more civilized, says Justice Brewer, in his
extra-curial addresses, to prevent an act by injunction
than to punish it. But, it will not be punished, unless
some law has forbidden it, nor then, unless, despite that
prohibition some one has had the temerity to do it. But if
the legislature's prohibition has failed to secure respect,
and punishment has become necessary, what shall assure
us that the judge's prohibition will insure respect, and that
he will not find it necessary to punish the disobedience of
it?
If the things prohibited by the injunction of the judge
have not been penalized by the legislature, -then, it is easy
to see that when the judge prohibits it, he has actually
•5Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat, 38; New Orleans v. N. Y. Mail
S. S. Co., 87 U. S. 387.
2 Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713.
2 7Ex parte Chetwood, 165 U. S. 443.
281Bersette v. Conkey Co., 174 U. S. 324. But, even under the
existing legislation there is no review as to the facts but only as to
the law. It is still thought, doubtless, that to allow a review of the
facts would like requiring the concurrence of a jury, put too much
restraint on the arbitrium of the judge.
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brought -in the odious thing called punishment, where the
Congress or the legislature has abstained from bringing it
in. Multiplying prohibitions with fines and imprison-
ments, as consequences of disobedience, is a certain way of
multiplying punishments, for surely human nature being
what it is, the greater the number of things men cannot
do without punishment, the more frequent will punish-
ment be.
But in truth, the injunction is resorted to, in many
cases in which the existing law, common or statute, has
given no remedy; in which it has neither criminalized the
act threatened, nor given damages for it. Not a few in-
junctions have been-issued to prevent acts which, if done,
would without them incur no punishment, either as tort or
crime, nor subject the doer to the payment of any damages.
In other cases, the recoverable damages are not deem-
ed an equivalent of the mischief apprehended from the pro-
hibited act, either because the doer will prove insolvent ,r
because a suit would be tedious, costly, and success in it
doubtful. In other cases, in which the act is already pen-
alized by the legislature, the penalization by a judge is pre-
ferred, because he makes the penalty as severe as he choos-
es; sometimes more severe than the criminal statute
would authorize; and because the judge is more certain to
find the enjoined person guilty, than would a judge and
jury, sitting in a criminal court. In the criminal -Court,
the evidence must convince twelve men, posibly thirteen,
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the case can be deflected
into a so-called civil Court, this rule can be evaded and it
will be enough, in order to convict the alleged violater of
the mandate, to satisfy one man, and, if he is willing, by a
mere preponderance of evidence.2 9 The safeguards against
29Preponderance is enough, according to some courts; Flannery
v. People, 225 II. 62. When the act alleged is already criminalized,
some courts have held though illogically that the evidence must con-
vince beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Carrdl, 147 Fed.
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punishment of an act because the Congress or the legisla-
ture has forbidden it, are vastly greater -than those against
punishment of an -act, even the same act, which the judge
has chosen by his injunction to criminalize. It is so much
graver an offense to sin against the judge, one man though
he be, than to sin by precisely the same act, against the
Congress, composed though it be, of 450 men, elected by
the people.
The legislatures have not been taxed with exerting too
little their penalizing power. Indeed, the number of stat-
utes criminalizing acts heretofore dispunishable grows at a
disquieting rate, and if judges, not content with the civil
or penal consequences already prescribed by -the legislature,
are to add to the legislative list of penalized acts, -a list of
their own, the lot of the citizen becomes a cause of anx-
iety. "The whole scientific thought of today is to cure ev-
ils rather than to punish them," but how forbidding is cur-
ing, how forbidding under penalty, is curing rather than
punishing, it is indeed difficult to see.
Congress has already interfered with injunctions by
limiting the punishments which the enjoining Courts may
impose, and by granting to an Appellate Court a power to
review, to a certain extent, the sentence upon the contempt.
It is by no means clear that still further improvements may
not be introduced. It is not evident that the bill once par-
tially passed should not be enacted providing for the co-
operation of a jury, when, the facts alleged to be violations
of the injunction are denied. But at all events, the at-
tempt to foreclose discussion, by vague generalization like
"prevention is better than punishment," is unworthy of
serious consideration.
947. But, as the court is not enforcing the penalty of the crime,
that is, of the violation of the command of the legislature, but only
its own penalty, it need logically no more apply the "beyond reason-




Landlord and Tenant - Suitability of Premises for Purpose Leased
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Fisher let for 3 years at the rent of $400 per year a house
containing 20 rooms. Wisher intended and Fisher knew that he
had intended to conduct a boarding house in it. In this action for
the rent, Wisher claims to set off damages for the leaky condition
of the roof, and the consequent inabi'ity to obtain and retain board-
ers. The court excludes the evidence of the damages.
Snyder, for the plaintiff.
Puhak, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MACGREGOR, J. The court was correct in excluding the evi-
dence of the damages suffered through the condition of the roof,
as a set-off to the rent claim. Questions concerning -the facts are
to be submitted to the jury, those of the law are to be determined
by the court. The Court decided that under the Pennsylvania law,
Wisher had no right to set-off damages sus;ained against the sum
claimed by Fisher as rent under the lease. If the law was reverse
to what it is, then it would have been necessary to submit the evi-
dence of the damages to the jury, so that it could det=mine if there
was any damage actually due to the causes alleged, and if so, to
what extent. Thus the question becomes one concerning the
right of the set-off.
Trickett in "Landlord and Tenant," p. 140, says "The tenant may
set-off contractual claims which he has against the lessor, although
there was no agreement between them that such claim might be
set-off," and later -says, "but damages arising from the
breach by the lessor of his covenant in the lease may
be set-off," and also, "unliquidated damages arising
from the landlord's tort ............... cannot be set-off." Thus
any rights which Wisher may have to set off are either for liquida-
ed damages arising out of a tort, or for breach of the contractual
relations. Liquidated damages is not involved for the contention
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in this case shows that the damage, if any, is unascertained and un-
liquidated. As no right to set-off for damnagts of an unliquidated
nature arises out of a landlord's tort, we may determine whether
Wisher could have any right to a set-off based upon a contractual
claim or claims.
Wisher makes no statements that there were any covenants
or conditions put into the original agreement as to the property
being fit for the purpose for which he intended to use it. If there
had been any such expressed covenants or conditions, he, unques-
tionably, would not come into any court merely averring 'that Fish-
er knew to what -purpose he, Wisher, intended to put the property
which he was leasing. Therefore, the question naturally restricts
itself as to whether there is an implied warranty that they are fit
for a particular purpose, or not, whenever the -lessor is acquainted
with the purpose for which they are being leased.
This question is well settled in the Pennsylvania law. Trickett in
"Landlord and Tenant," p. 68, sec. 81, says, "but there -is no -implied
promise on the part of the lessor that they are fit for -any particu-
lar purpose, e. g., of being a boarding house," and, p. 69, sec. 82,
"The fact that .the lessor knows to what use the lessee intends
to put the premises, does not imply a covenant on his part that they
are adapted to the use. But in all these cases, the iten-
ant must exercise his own judgment as to the fitness of the prem-
iru'es now, and the probable continuance of their fitness hereafter
fcr his uses and needs and he must rely on his judgment, unless
he obtains an express covenant from the lessor, or unless -the land-
lord's representations are intended to dissuade, and do dissuade the
tenant from investigation."
In Bussman v. Ganster, 72 Pa. 285, lessee was held for rent al-
though store-room had been destroyed by fire; in Wheeler v. Craw-
ford, 86 Pa. 327, in an action for rent, it was held to be no defense
that the property was not in -a tenantable condition; in Twibill v.
Brown, 1 C. C. 350, no implied warranty of suitableness; in Moore v.
Weber, 71 Pa. 429, no implied obligation to repair or that they are
fit; and also that the rule of "caveat emptor" applies to leases;
in Kelly v. Miller, 249 Pa. 314, no implied covenant that the land-
lord warrants the leased premises to be tenantable. Thus we see
that there was no contractual relation, growing out of an implied
covenant, and we are forced to conclude that the cour' was correct
in excludiig the evidence of the damages.
However, we ought to consider the contention of the counsel
for Wisher that -the law may grow through change of decisions,
by a court refusing to follow the beaten path of precedent. In his
brief to support this contention, 'that reasonableness and justice
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demand a progressive decision, council cites a Tennessee Supreme
Court case, Hines v. Wilcox, 34 L. R. A. 824. This case is decidedly
different from the one at bar. In Hines v. Wilcox, there was
involved oral evidence that larndord agreed to put the leased prem-
ises in a safe condition, -and the matter of damages for the tort of
negligence. We do not see much, if anything, in common in that
case and in this, therefore it could not outweigh the mass of deci-
sions upholding the principle that there was no inplied promise,
and our resulting conclusion that the court was correct in exclud-
ing 'the evidence of damages.
Affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The decision of the learned court below is well supported by
the -authorities cited by it, and by the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in a similar case, Stull v. Thompson, 154 Pa. 48.
WEIDNER v. R. R. CO.
Negligence-Presumption Arising Against Common Carriers Upon
Proof of Accident to Passengers
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Weidner, a passenger in defendant's train alleges that while
the car was standing another car was allowed to run violently
r~mainat it, with the result that he was thrown forcibly from his
seat, and his spine injured. In his suit for damages, the contends
that the violence of the coupling is "prima facia" evidence of neg-
ligence. The court upholds this view. Verdict for $2500.
Vaughn, for the plaintiff.
Gorsoil, M. M., for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SALSBURG, J. The fact of the collision and injury to a pas-
senger raises a presumption of negligence against the carrier. Abel
v. Northampton Traction Company, 212 Pa. 529; Sandbuck v. South-
ern Pacific Co. 71 Pa. 174; Chicago City R. Co. Mead, 107 IMI. App.
649; Ivagrane v. St. Louis & Suburban R. Co., 183 Mo. 149; Ander-
son v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 52 N. Y. Supp,. 984.
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Though -there are statments to the contrary, it is now well set-
tled that -the mere proof of an accident resulting in injury to a pas-
senger, does not necessarily create a presumption of negligence
against the carrier. The rule is different in the case of the ear-
rier of goods, but the carrier there is an insurer, and other strik-
ing differences exist between them the two kinds of carriers. How-
ever where it is shown that the thing is under the management
of the defendant or his servants, and the accident be such as, in the
ordinary course of things, does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care,--and in this case it would be, that
care which human foresight and prudence would suggest-it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defen-
dant, that the accident arose from the lack of the required degree
of care. Williams v. Spokane Falls & N. R. Co., 39 Wash. 77? Skin-
ner v. Ry. Co., 5 Exch. 786; Nagel v. U. S. Ry. Go, 169 Mo. App.
284.
In the case at bar there can be little doubt that the above cases
apply and a presumption of negligence would oxise.
In Osgood v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 44 N. Y. Supp. 742,
and the Chicago City R. Co. v. Engel, 36 Il. App. 490, it was held
that where the cars of one company bump with the cars of another,
a presumption of negligence arises against the carrier., If this
is true, then why wouldn't the same rule be true, reasoning by an-
elegy, when the collision is caused by the impact of two cars of the
same company?
The main distinction which regulates the raising -a presump-
tion of negligence against the carrier is whether the act or thing
causing the injury was within the carrier's control. If it was, and
was not of the ordinary operation of the road, or a usual und nec-
essarily existing condition, and the -passenger was not contribu-
torily negligent, the presumption arises. 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 605,
note.
We think the motor which generates the power to operate the
car and the servant of the company who controls and manipulates
the motor, both fall within the above rule. The company must se-
lect servants with great precaution and can only exempt it-
self from liability, when they have been shown to have exercis-
ed the highest degree of practicable care. Dobie on Bailments, p.
607.
Since there was a collision and the selection of the servants
-and the motor are both within the control of the company, we
feel the burden of proof should be upon them to show why the
violent coupling occured, if not by their own negligence in so hand-
ling or controlling the same. When cars are coupled properly there
Dickiwsm Law Review
should be hardly a perceptible impact. Millions of cars have been
proven to do so in a single day without a single accident .In the
case at bar the contact was so violent as to throw the paintiff out
of -his seat. This in -tself shows negligence.
In 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 613, note, a passenger being knocked
from the car by a sudden and violent jerk, was allowed to -recov-
er. The judge in this case said, "The tendency of the decisions
seems to be that if the jerk is of such violence that it would not
be one liable to occur in the ordinary operations of transporta-
tion, a presumption of negligence arises." The facts were similar to
those in the case at bar and we see no reason why the same princi-
ple should not apply.
McClasky v. R. R. Co., 156 Pa. 254, is on all fours with our
present case. The judge there said, " Cars must be coupled by the
backing of an engine, but employees must do it in such a manner
and with such care as not to injure passengers sitting -therein. If
such an injury occurs then the paintiff, unless -he himself is neg-
ligent, should recover."
In Niebalski v. R. R. Co., 249 Pa. 530, there was a recovery
and a presumption of negligence against the railroad company
when the plaintiff was injured by the collision between two cars.
The -accident happened independently ef anything that the plain-
tiff did, which was similar to the attitude of Weidner in this
case. ,
The lower court was justified in its finding and is affirmed
by this tribunal.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The learned court below has well supported its decision. In
actions by passengers against common carriers, "where an injury oc-
curs from a collision as in the present case, the plaintiff is not re-
quired to show -ny specific act of negligence but may rest his case
entirely upon the presumption of negligence." Niebalski v. Pa. R.
R. Co., 249 Pa. 530. In that case, the injury was the effect of a col-
lision between the train in which the plaintiff was riding and a yard
engine. In this case there was a collision between the car in which
-the plaintiff was sitting and another car. No attempt was made
to show contributory negligence of the plaintiff. It will not be
presumed. It follows that the judgment must be affirmed.
Dickinson Law Review
BANE v. R. R. CO.
Evidence-Province of Jury in Re Setting Aside of a Written Instru-
ment
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In driving across the tracks of the defendant, Bane was run
into by a train and dangerously injured, both bodily and mentally.
Some weeks after, while still very feeble, and with slight power
to understand or attend, an agent of defendant showed -him a paper,
misdescribed its nature, asked him to sign it, and gave him $250.
The paper signed purported .to be a release of the defendant from
all liability. The agent of the company who proved .te execution
of the paper, and a person who accompanied him, denied the tes-
timony of the plaintiff and stated that the paper was read end
explained -to him and that plaintiff -aid he would accept $250 as
a fair equivalent for the injury sustained. The plaintiff, alone,
proved his mentally feeble condition at the execution of the paper,
his ignorance of its import and the misrepresentation of its import.
The court told -the jury that if -the facts stated by the plaintiff
were true, the release would be no impediment to a recovery of
damages; but that as -they were known only to the plaintiff, and
denied by two disinterested witnesses, they could not be accepted
as facts and the release precluded a recovery.
Groome, for the plaintiff.
Miller, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
LITCHENSTEIN, J. It is clear that the lower court erred in
its charge to the jury. They have said, in part, "as they were
known only to the plaintiff, and denied by two disinterested wit-
nesses they could not be accepted as facts, and the release pre-
cluded a xecovery." In equity this statement would prevail, for
there the rule is, "when there is an oath against oath the denial
must prevail." In a court of law, however, this doctrine has no
application. In Gibson v. R. R. Co., 164 Pa. 142,
the plaintiff alone testified -to 'his mentally feeble condition, and
FIVE disinterested witnesses testified against him. Of this num-
ber, four were reputable physicians. It was held, "It was a mat-
ter for the jury, who shall determine which portion of the testi-
mony shall prevail, and render a verdict accordingly."
The plaintiff testified that there was not that co-operation
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between mind and will, which are essential elements of a valid con-
t at; defendants claim that there was. If there was not such co-
operation "then in contemplation of law, there was no execution and
delivery of the alleged release. A substantial question of fact was
then presented which it was the exclusive province of the jury to
determine in the ordinary way." Lindeman v. Pittsburg R. R. Co..
251 Pa. 491. Under these circumstances, the desire is not to amend
or alter, or receive the release. The contention is, that, admitting
the release to have been made, it was made under such circumstan-
ces as to render it ineffective. This doctrine is well settled in Jul-
ius v. Pittsburg Traction Co., 184 Pa. 19, and Spritzer v. Penna. R.
R., 226 Pa. 166. When a release of the defendant, for a consider-
ation, is obtained from the plaintiff, discharging him from lia-
bility for damages, the release shall not be a bar, if at the time of
its execution, the plaintiff is mentally incapacitated, and unable
to understand the import of the instrument.
Under the circumstances, and the cases cited above, the charge
of the court was erroneous, and a new trial is ordered. If the jury
decide that the -testimony of the plaintiff is true, he is entitled to
an action against the defendant company, and to recover damages
for. the injury sustained.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The court erred in instructing the jury that the facts testified
to by Bane could not be accepted by the jury as facts because
they were affirmed by plaintiff only and were denied by two dis-
interested witnesses. The rule in Pennsylvania is that "where in
a common law action the attempt is not to alter or vary a written
instrument but -to overcome it wholly and set it aside, the point in
controversy, no matter that it be contradicted by many opposing
witnesses, requires a submission of the fact so raised to the jury.
Spritzer v. Pa. R. R. Co., 226 Pa. 166; Gordon v. A. P. Tea Co., 243
Pa. 335. 'The rule applies though the single witness is a party
to the suit. Spritzer v. Pa. R. R. Co., supra.
If the circumstances attending -the signing of the release were
as testified to by the plaintiff, the release does not preclude a re-
covery by the plaintiff. Spritzer v. R. R. Co., supra; Gordon v.
Tea Co., supra. The new trial was properly granted.
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NATIONAL BANK v. OLIVER
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Contracts--Agency-Effect of Insanity of One of the Parties Where
the Contract is Executed-Knowledge of Agent of the Insanity
of the Other Party
Oliver drew a note for $5000 payable to himself, which he en-
dorsed and had discounted by the plaintiff bank. This note he
made at the instigation of X, to whom he intended to pass the money
by check. The day following the discounting, Oliver drew a check
for $4500, payable to X, who presenting it the same day, obtained
the money from the bank. The remainder of the deposit of Oliver
has since been checked out by him. At the time when the discount
occurred, Oliver was insane. The plaintiff's president knew this.
He was also a friend of X and knew that Oliver's intention, in pre-
senting the discount, was to lend the money to X. The court al-
lowed a recovery for the amount of the note.
Setzer, for appellant.
Royal, for appellee.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SINGERMAN, J. The case at bar presents the question as
to what is the status of a contract made by an insane person. It
hgs been a matter of great dispute as to whether the contract is
void or voidable.
According to Pollock on Contracts, page 87, the early law con-
sidered that insanity was no ground whatever, for the avoiding of
a contract. Co. Litt. 2 b; 4 Co. 123 b; Bracton fol. 10D a, 165 b.
In the United States, there are at least three distinct views in force.
In some courts what has been termed the Massachusetts doctrine
prevails, that contracts of insane persons are voidable without any
reference to the knowledge of the other party. Seaver v. Phelps,
11 Pick. (Mass.) 304.
In others, what is termed the English doctrine prevails (be-
cause supported by more recent English authorities), that they are
voidable, if the other party knows of the insanity; Stockmeyer v.
Tobin, 139 U. S. 176; Martinez v. Moll, 46 Fed. 724; Lancaster
County National Bank v. Moore, 78 Pa. 407; and reasonable ground
for knowledge is equivalent thereto, Lincoln v. Buckmaster, 82 Vt.
652.
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The third doctrine supported by some courts is that if the other
party was ignorant and the contract reasonable and not capable of
recission, so that the parties could be restored to their original
position, the contract will be sustained. Appeal of Kneedler, 92 Pa.
428.
However, in general, the contract of a person non compos
mentis is voidable, and not void. Turner v. Rusk, 53 Md. 65; Van
Patton v. Beals, 46 Ia. 62; Ingraham v. Baldwin, 9 N. Y. 45.
It is unquestionable law that an insane person may contract
for the necessaries sulitable to his state and condition in life, and
may be liable therefor. McCormick v. Littler, 85 Ill. 62; SawyoT
v. Lufkin, 56 Me. 308; Kendall v. May, 10 Allen 59; La Rue v.
Gilkyson, 4 Pa. 375. Such liability, however, is created by law,
and therefore only quasi ex contractu, so that the amount to be re-
covered is the true value and not the price agreed on by the insane
person. Mulligan v. Pollard, 112 Ala. 465.
The facts show that the contract was executed, and the weight
of authority holds, that when the contract is executed so that the
insane person has received a benefit from it, and the parties can-
not be restored to their former positions, proof of the actual insan-
ity of one of the parties at the time of the making of the contract,
unaccompanied by any proof that the other knew or ought to have
known of his condition, will not avoid the contract. Kneedler's
Appeal, 92 Pa. 428; Lancaster County National Bank v. Moore, 78
Pa. 407; Beals v. See, 10 Pa. 56; Snyder v. Lauback, 7 W. N. C.
464. It is otherwise if the sane party knew of the other's insanity.
Fecel v. Guinault, 32 La. Ann. 91; Creekmore v. Baxter, 121 N. C.
31; or if the circumstances were such that as a reasonable and
prudent man, he should have known of it. Halley v. Troester, 72
Mo. 73; Mattheissen Rfg. Co. v. McMahon, 38 N. J. L. 536.
The recent case of First National Bank v. Fidelity Title and
Trust Co., Admnr., 251 Pa. 529, holds that "if he was insane, he
was only liable to the extent of the benefits received by him,
whether they were given for his own individual indebtedness or
were endorsed as an accommodation."
When Oliver presented the note for discount, did the bank
have knowledge of his insanity? The facts show that the bank
president knew of his condition, and also knew for what purpose it
was being discounted. Is the knowledge of the bank's president im-
putable to the plaintiff bank?
The learned counsel for the appellee, in his brief, states that
"it was to the personal advantage of the president of the plaintiff
bank, in the case at bar, to conceal his knowledge of the insanity
of Oliver, the defendant, and of the motive which caused the latter
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to obtain the discount. This knowledge cannot be imputed to the
bank, for this reason." To support that statement he quotes the
case of the First National Bank v. Fidelity Title and Trust Co.,
251 Pa. 529.
It is a settled rule of agency that when an officer is individ-
ually interested in a note or other matter, his knowledge is not to
be imputed to the bank or his principal, since his interest Is best
served by concealing it. 5 Cyc. 461; Campbell v. Balcomb, 183 Fed.
766; Merchants National Bank v. Nicholas, etc. Co., 223 ll. 41;
Camden Safe Deposit Co. v. Lord, 67 N. J. Eq. 489; Cave v. Cave,
15 Ch. D. 639. The agent's adverse interest or participation in the
scheme to defraud the principal raises the presumption that the
agent will not inform his principal. American National Bank v.
Miller, 229 U. S. 517; U. S. v. National Bank of Commerce, 205 Fed.
443; Sproul v. Standard Plate Glass Co., 201 Pa. 103; United Se-
curity Ins. Co. v. Central National Bank, 185 Pa. 586; Gunster v.
Natl. Illum. etc. Power Co., 181 Pa. 327; Musser v. Hyde, 2 W.
and S. 314; Falcolni v. Magee, 47 Sup. 560; Dominion Trust Co. v.
Hildner, 243 Pa. 253. As stated in Seabald v. Citizens Deposit Bank,
105 S. W. 130, the reason for the rule is that "where the agent i3
dealing for himself, "and not for the principal, or is perpetrating a
fraud upon his principal, the presumption that he would commun-
icate his knowledge to his principal is contrary to the experience of
men and to their nature."
Do the facts in the case at bar show that the president of the
plaintiff bank was acting for himself, or that he was perpetrating
a fraud on his principal? There is not one scintilla of evidence to
show such designs or acts.
On this point, if not on any others, is the case of First Na-
tional Bank v. Fidelity Title and Trust Co., supra, distinguished
from the case at bar. In that case the president of the bank was
vitally interested in the discounting of the note, and hence it was
rightly decided that his knowledge could not be imputed to the bank.
in our opinion, the adverse interest must be a legal adverse
interest, as contra-distinguished from an adverse interest created
merely through friendship. Despite the fact that the counsel for
the appellee states that the affair was of personal advantage to the
president, we are of the opinion that such statement is utterly
groundless. Friendship creates many ties, but rarely is it so
strong that it causes the commission of a breach of faith, such as
occurred in the case at bar. Counsel for the appellee has placed
too much reliance upon the case of First National Bank v. Fidel-
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ity Title and Trust Co., 251 Pa. 529, whose facts are not similar
to those in the case at bar.
As error was committed in allowing a recovery for the full
amount of the note, judgment must be reversed with directions to
the lower Court that Oliver is responsible for only so much as was
drawn out by him for his actual needs and use.
OPINION OF SUPIEME COURT
There could be no doubt of the right of the bank to recover
$5000 from Oliver, had he not been insane.
Nor could the bank's right to recover be denied, even if Oliver
was insane, unless the bank, at the time of discounting the note,
knew that he was insane.
If Oliver was insane, and the bank knew that he was insane,
we think it should not be allowed to recover to the extent to which
Oliver gratuitously parted with the proceeds, even if the bank did
not know of his intention thus to part with it. The fact of insanity
should have given pause to the bank. It should have anticipated
the probability of a loss of the proceeds, and should therefore, have
abstained from affording the discount, until it had become sure
that no foolish appropriation would be made.
If the president's knowledge is to be attributed to the bank,
the bank knew not merely that Oliver was insane, and hence, might
make a ruinous use of the proceeds, but that he intended to "pass
the money," as loan or gift, to X. The bank cannot enforce the
note, beyond $500, if the president's knowledge is to be deemed the
knowledge of the bank.
The president acted for the bank, so far as appears, not sim-
ply in presenting the request of Oliver for a discount, to the board
of directors, but in making the decision to discount. We think
that when the person who solely acting for the bank in the process
of discounting knows a fact, the principal for whom he acts must
be treated as knowing it. If he had an interest antagonistic to his
principal's, with respect to the divulging of a fact, there may be
reason for saying that he will be presumed not to have communica-
ted this fact to the other agent of the principal, who is to act or
to the principal himself, who is to act. The case is different, when
the agent who has the knowledge is not expected to reveal it to any
one else, who has the deciding will.
But, even if we assume that the President did not decide that
the discount should be made, but merely conveyed the application
to the board of directors, with any knowledge of pertinent facts that
he may have had, we think the opinion of the learned court below
Dickinson Law Review
sound, that a mere wish to facilitate the discount, from friendship
for the person who was to be benefited by it, should not be deemed
sufficient to induce the refusal of the theory of imputation. How
multitudinous the imaginable degrees of interest, Ocf friendship.
Perhaps the phrase employed by the learned court below "a legal
adverse interest" is not strictly accurate. We think he should ex-
pect a personal benefit of a pecuniary or proprietary sort. The prop-
osition of the Supreme Court is "no agent who is acting in his own
antagonistic interest or who is about to commit a fraud by which
his principal will be affected, does in fact inform the latter, and
any conclusion drawn from a presumption that he has done so is
contrary to all experience of human nature." Gunster v. Power
Co., 181 Pa. 327; Trust Co. v. Hildner, 243 Pa. 253. It would be
impolitic to allow a jury to speculate as to the emotions of the Pres-
ident or other agent, in order to discover whether he would be like-
ly or not, to tell other agents a fact, the knowledge by them of
which, would possibly or probably defeat a transaction which these
emotions dispose him to favor.
Judgment affirmed.
(Although the conclusion reached by the learned court below
is we think, sound, we cannot approve of the indulgence In an ex-
cessive number of citations. No principle needs more than 3 or 4
clear decisions to justify its laying down.)
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BOOK REVIEWS
Cases and Other Authorities in Legal Ethics, by George P. Cos-
tigan, Jr., Professor of Law in Northwestern University. Published
by the West Pub shing Company, St. Paul, Minn., 1917.
This work deals with a subject that has lately attracted more
than the usual attention. The authorities cited by it are very num-
erous. They are classified under various headings: history and or-
ganization of the legal profession; the lawyer's qualification; the
mission and discipline of lawyers; their duties to courts; legal ethics
in general; solicitation of business; duties of lawyers in criminal
cases; and in civil cases; pecuniary relations of lawyer and client;
miscellaneous topics. A final chapter contains Hoffman's Fifty
Resolutions in regard to professional deportment, the American
Bar Association's Canons, and the oath of admission. The work is
a vast repertory of the most important dicta and adjudications of
eminent lawyers, lawyers' associations, and courts. Not every in-
structor 6f legal ethics wit feel obliged to conduct his classes over
all the contents of this work, but he will be able to make from it
suitable selections bearing on almost every conceivable subject that
can be termed ethical. A large amount of labor has been ex-
pended in bringing together the contents of this work, and there can
be litt(e difference of opinion concerning the discretion with which
the selections have been made.
May we express the hope that, while a marked revival of in-
terest has occurred in regard to the "ethical" conduct of lawyers,
there may not grow up a body of professional casuists who seek to
impose their opinions on others in respect to matters whose decis-
ion should remain with the uncoerced conscience of the individual
practitioner.
The Creation of Corporations for Profit in Pennsylvania, by
John F. Whitworth, Esq. T. and J. W. Johnson Co., PhiladelpW
1917.
The author of this supplement, embracing the statutes and de-
cisions on the subject of corporations, enacted and published between
the years 1914 and 1917, is well known to the profession of Penn-
sylvania. His original work on Corporations has been in their
hands since 1902. Its merits are too well known to need expla-
nation here. The supplement, constructed on the same plan, devel-
ops the law on this very important topic, to the present. Those
who have found the primary book so useful, will not delay to
procure this supplementary treatise.
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THE THOUGHT OF AN EMINENT
LAWYER
The following is taken from a letter
written a short time ago, by the distin-
guished lawyer, whose name follows.
Whilst I think that no one should be
admitted to the bar who is not able to
pass an examination upon matters not
necessarily those of law, I would deem
it very unjust and inadvisable to im-
pose as a prerequisite to admission to
the bar, a college education.
I think this would be an artificial
requirement which would be unjust and
would accomplish no good result.
J. G. JOHNSON.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Nov. 27, 1914.
~~iZIXk~V
S -
